India’s space security policy, part 1: history’s second cutby Pranav R. Satyanath
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| India, in fact, is remarkably consistent in its preferences for outer space arms control and risk reduction measures, even though it has not put forward concrete proposals and approaches to tackle space threats. |
This two-part essay unpacks India’s space security policy. This essay (part 1) analyzes why India abstained from voting on the United Nations (UN) resolution to ban debris-creating direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) testing, and India’s justification of vote reflects on its space security policy. Some analysts have argued that the choice to abstain from voting is an indication of strategic ambiguity. Indeed, policymakers and government officials have provided very little clarity about India’s space security policy since it conducted its DA-ASAT test in March 2019. However, this is only half the story.
A closer reading of India’s statements in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the UN First Committee reveals that the country’s diplomats and policymakers are far less ambiguous about New Delhi’s space security interests. India, in fact, is remarkably consistent in its preferences for outer space arms control and risk reduction measures, even though it has not put forward concrete proposals and approaches to tackle space threats.
Looking back at India’s often-forgotten history of space security diplomacy offers a fascinating insight into the evolving ambitions of a rising space power. India was a proactive participant in the UN’s Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) agenda of the 1980s. This period was marked by New Delhi’s criticism of US President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and its vocal opposition to the militarization and weaponization of space more broadly.
In 1986, as part of the Six-Nation Initiative, India, along with Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania, called on the United States and the Soviet Union to halt all testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities and eventually ban ASATs. That same year, Indian diplomats berated the American efforts to develop space-based missile defenses and called for multilateral negotiations on an ASAT ban agreement. In the same statement, Indian representatives also argued that calls for a perfect verification regime must not “be construed as a pretext for not banning ASAT weapons.” Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, India championed its opposition to the weaponization of space both independently and through the Six-Nation Initiative.
For much of the 1990s, India deplored the development of ballistic missile defenses (BMDs), which were seen as technologies closely related to anti-satellite weapons. But this was soon to change. After the overt nuclear tests of May 1998, India’s politicians saw the need to develop limited BMDs around the national capital, marking the slow and subtle shift in India’s space security policy.
In the early years, India’s BMD program had little to do with ASAT capabilities. China’s ASAT test in 2007, however, came as a wake-up call for defense intellectuals, policymakers, and scientists alike. While the then foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee stressed the need to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, behind the scenes, the defense and scientific bureaucracies slowly galvanized support for India’s own ASAT capability.
| The DA-ASAT test of 2019 did little to change India’s position on risk reduction in outer space. Instead, the test was a symbolic demonstration< of India’s ascent as a space power with expanding geopolitical interests. |
Around the same time, efforts to curtail debris-creating testing and weaponization of space also led to two parallel efforts in international fora. In 2008, Russia and China put forward the first draft of the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), a proposed legally binding agreement that called for a ban on the placement of weapons in space and threat or use of force against space objects. Although contentious clauses and omissions riddled the PPWT, India’s diplomats believed it was a treaty worth considering as the draft could be improved upon over the coming sessions of the CD, and said that the PPWT could help in “filling the existing gaps in the international legal regime.”
On the other hand, the European Union (EU) proposed a Draft International Code of Conduct (ICoC) in December 2008. The EU’s proposal was far less keen on achieving a legally binding outcome and instead aimed to establish norms and rules of responsible behavior through a set of prescriptive guidelines that countries could follow. Unlike the PPWT, the draft ICoC took aim at controlling behaviors in space rather than controlling for space capabilities. Moreover, unlike the PPWT, the ICoC emphasized space sustainability, particularly the deliberate creation of space debris.
While India showed some interest in the EU’s draft proposal, its attitude towards the ICoC was lukewarm. New Delhi objected to the ICoC based on two arguments. First, it perceived the ICoC’s non-legally binding format to be ad-hoc and, therefore, unsuited to serve as a universally acceptable code. Second, India felt that the ICoC fell short of preventing the weaponization of outer space as it attempted to control behaviors and not the capabilities that contribute to space threats.
Redrafts of the PPWT and the ICoC did little to bridge the gap between the two approaches and divided the US-EU and Russia-China blocs even further. The period between 2008 and 2015 shaped New Delhi’s attitude towards and sharpened the country’s preferences for risk reduction measures. The country’s exclusion from the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts also made India recognize the premium placed on its status as a space power. The DA-ASAT test of 2019 did little to change India’s position on risk reduction in outer space. Instead, the test was a symbolic demonstration of India’s ascent as a space power with expanding geopolitical interests.
India’s experience in negotiating in international fora has thus been molded into a space security policy that consists of three distinct elements: (1) the need for legally binding instruments in space; (2) openness to negotiating non-discriminatory, universally-applicable transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) that could complement legally binding instruments and; (3) aversion to purely non-legally binding measures, which are deemed ad-hoc and non-universal.
These preferences have also driven India to abstain from voting on the US-led test moratorium, albeit with some changes. In its explanation of the vote, India stated that the resolution does not address the legally binding aspects of the proposed test moratorium. Further, at the second meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing Space Threats, India also argued that the issue of space sustainability must not confound space security—a sentiment echoed by some Western countries. More importantly, Indian diplomats made their preference for legally-binding instruments unequivocally clear by stating the following:
“It is our preference to have a legally binding instrument because it elicits stronger guarantee of compliance and a greater commitment by States to adhere to the obligations. However, we are also open to the development of non-binding outcomes such as common rules and norms and transparency & confidence building measures since they are complementary in nature and can serve as a foundation for binding agreements.”
Further, New Delhi reiterated the need for an objective assessment of responsible and irresponsible behaviors, as it fears that a pure norms-based approach will lock it into a security architecture with no legal accountability. So, if not a DA-ASAT test moratorium and normative measures which allow states to conduct a broad set of actions, then what other measures?
By all counts, the proposed DA-ASAT test moratorium favors India more than hinders its options. Under the test ban, India could continue to test DA-ASATs and missile defenses at simulated virtual targets. However, New Delhi’s aversion to a complete norms-based approach means that India might seek a legally binding agreement that codifies a ban on testing. India could also push for additional TCBMs to strengthen the proposed prohibition of DA-ASAT testing.
| India’s newfound bargaining power will go to waste if policymakers refuse to take the lead on space security matters and instead choose to remain a bystander. |
India could also pursue a different approach, such as advocating for sharing space situational awareness (SSA) data to increase transparency. India has taken unilateral steps to improve its own transparency and bilateral measures to cooperate with the US on SSA data sharing. Given the dual-use nature of SSA systems, constructing a data-sharing regime for outer space is easier said than done. Nonetheless, taking the lead on SSA measures could strengthen India’s position as a responsible space-faring nation.
Although very little can be said with confidence about the credibility and deterrence effects of India’s anti-satellite capabilities, the ASAT test of 2019 strengthened India’s stake in the safety and security of outer space. However, its newfound bargaining power will go to waste if policymakers refuse to take the lead on space security matters and instead choose to remain a bystander.
A closer reading of India’s statements in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the UN First Committee reveals that the country’s diplomats and policymakers are far less ambiguous about New Delhi’s space security interests. India, in fact, is remarkably consistent in its preferences for outer space arms control and risk reduction measures, even though it has not put forward concrete proposals and approaches to tackle space threats.
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