NASA needs to qualify, not certify. commercial space stationsby Steve Hoeser
|
| This shift away from traditional NASA programs signals a need to reassess these legacy processes and policies—established during the Apollo era and refined for the ISS—that will determine the viability of future commercial space facilities. |
For decades, habitable space stations have been owned and operated exclusively by governments, with the notable exception of the ill-fated attempt to privatize Russia’s Mir. This paradigm is poised to shift, driven by growing demand from both governmental and commercial sectors. Declining launch costs, coupled with NASA’s plan to retire the ISS in 2030, underscore the urgency of ensuring a sustained US human presence in low Earth orbit. In response, NASA has launched two initiatives: a non-reimbursable Space Act Agreement (SAA) and the Commercial LEO Destinations (CLD) program. These efforts aim to secure orbital facilities for NASA astronauts while catalyzing the development of US-owned commercial space stations.
The SAA contract is with Axiom Space and the second contract is a competitive CLD commercial space station development program with multiple commercial teams. The Axiom agreement provides for at least one habitable commercial module to be attached directly to the ISS prior to its decommissioning. Axiom’s plans are to add additional commercial modules to this module and fly this facility as an independent self-sustaining orbiting commercial space station.
The CLD program is structured as a public-private partnership. The intent is to create additional independently owned and operated commercial space stations. NASA has indicated they plan to lease space and services from these new commercial facilities to continue their space research and house NASA astronauts. These facilities will also support “commercial” customers who want to conduct international country sponsored research, industrial space manufacturing, commercial research, and potentially an adventure tourism destination.
No longer using government-owned and operated facilities, the advent of these commercial space facilities alters the government’s operational, program, and regulatory landscape. Specifically, NASA must decide how to ensure these private stations meet their needs. A key need is to ensure the safety of their astronaut “employees” who will be booking stays, leasing space, and using government-provided equipment on the space they rent from these new commercial space facilities. This shift away from traditional NASA programs signals a need to reassess these legacy processes and policies—established during the Apollo era and refined for the ISS—that will determine the viability of future commercial space facilities.
Perspectives and impacts of using certification
NASA considers its astronauts to be government employees, and therefore holds them to the same rigorous health and safety risk standards that apply to all NASA personnel. In light of this, NASA determined that the informed consent practices used for commercial spaceflight participants—outlined in the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) and administered by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—do not adequately fulfill the agency’s responsibility to ensure the health and safety of its astronauts.
In the past, NASA instituted “human rating” requirements under the CCP that were based on NASA’s previously used certification processes for the new commercial crew launch systems and capsules. Application of these stringent demands affected proposed design specifications, number and types of verification testing, and operational demonstrations. NASA’s former rules included additional requirements for systems to provide increased redundancy and specific abort systems. These additional mandates ended up adding time and costs to the program.
These CCP delays ended up forcing a continued dependence on and payments to Russia until May 2020. It wasn’t until then that SpaceX flew their first Crew-1 mission on its Falcon 9 using their Dragon capsule. This was more than ten years after the shuttle’s retirement, and almost four years after the initial planned SpaceX Commercial Crew first mission verification flight. Boeing has not yet conducted a successful flight test confidence mission to prove their Starliner’s worthiness for general transport of NASA astronauts. Furthermore, if Sierra Space’s commercial Dream Chaser transport is expected to meet the same certification and rating requirements established under NASA’s Commercial Crew Program, it will necessitate a new NASA contract to pay for work to authorize the vehicle for astronaut carriage.
Commercial space facilities present a paradigm shift
Under the ongoing CLD and Axiom SAAs, NASA is again employing a public-private partnership contract approach. This approach requires joint funding by select commercial company partners along with investments by NASA.
As part of their program approach NASA appears poised to extend the same human-rating processes to “certify” the new CLD habitats. This is being done even though these next-generation space stations will be commercially owned and operated, not government-owned platforms such as the ISS. This shift introduces three key challenges:
1. Ownership and control: NASA must navigate the complexities of creating and maintaining an ongoing process for certifying and recertifying systems it does not own or directly control, raising questions about oversight authority and operational accountability.
2. Liability and risk allocation: The agency must establish clear frameworks for liability and risk-sharing between NASA and commercial operators. This includes a clear agency and government position on indemnification, especially in scenarios involving government personnel aboard privately operated platforms.
3. Requirements harmonization: NASA’s internal safety and mission assurance requirements may conflict with commercial design and operational philosophies, requiring negotiation and adaptation to ensure mutual compliance without compromising astronaut safety.
NASA lacks statutory authority
Of key impact to addressing these issues is that NASA has no statutory authority to “certify” commercially owned and operated space facilities and systems. Unlike the FAA, NASA has not been directed nor granted the authority by Congress to conduct certification of commercial space facilities. They do, however, have every right (and the responsibility) to “qualify” commercial facilities for NASA personnel and equipment use. To clarify the important differences between qualification and certification:
| An unintended consequence of NASA’s assertion that it must certify commercial space facilities for safety is the implicit signal it sends to the broader marketplace: that facilities not certified by NASA may be inherently unsafe or substandard. |
Qualification refers to a system’s successfully meeting a set of requirements designated by contract using an agreed-to validation process. In this CLD partnership it means that alternative commercial practices, methods, and approaches to provide satisfactory evidence deserve consideration. A qualification approach better defines and scopes the needs, allowing for the CLD contractors to identify the costs and clearly define the schedule to meet these special customer requirements.
Certification by NASA of these facilities on the other hand, demands documented evidence through a dedicated and pre-established US government developed program that desired safety results are consistently obtained. This approach also requires that NASA must put in place and staff ongoing certification bureaucracy to handle continuing changes and new space stations. What results is a process that creates delays and injects future costs.
Creation of false market perceptions
An unintended consequence of NASA’s assertion that it must certify commercial space facilities for safety is the implicit signal it sends to the broader marketplace: that facilities not certified by NASA may be inherently unsafe or substandard. This perception—however unintentional—can distort market dynamics by creating a false dichotomy between “NASA-certified” and “uncertified” platforms. This could lead to potential vendor favoritism and undermining the credibility of other capable commercial providers. It may also discourage non-government customers from engaging with these “uncertified” facilities and, perhaps most damaging, it can sow doubt among investors through heightened regulatory uncertainty or a perception of diminished commercial viability for platforms outside NASA’s certification umbrella. In a nascent and fragile commercial LEO ecosystem, such perceptions can stifle innovation, limit competition, and slow the emergence of a diverse and resilient US lead orbital economy.
Creation of a gap in US orbital habitat capability
With NASA planning to decommission the ISS around 2030, delays in certifying new CLD facilities could lead to a significant US space station capability gap—echoing the setbacks experienced during the Commercial Crew Program. Such a gap would not only disrupt NASA’s access to orbital platforms but also hand strategic advantage to international competitors, particularly China, whose growing space station capabilities could attract global partners and commercial customers, further consolidating their leadership in low Earth orbit.
This concern was explicitly raised during a meeting earlier this year of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, where members warned that CLD facilities might not be “human-rated” in time if NASA continues applying legacy certification processes. The root issue is that NASA has yet to define what “rating” a commercial space station for NASA use actually entails. Such schedule delays and added costs will undermine the key objective of the CLD program which is, “….to facilitate the development of commercially owned and operated LEO destination from which NASA, along with other customers, can purchase series and stimulate the growth of commercial activities in LEO.”
If NASA is genuinely committed to partnership, it must move beyond the traditional model of top-down oversight. Rather than imposing legacy certification frameworks designed for government-owned systems, NASA should engage in collaborative dialogue with their commercial partners to create a qualification framework. This means clearly articulating safety and reliability expectations and working jointly to integrate any unique government requirements into facility service contracts—above and beyond the baseline standards of commercial station operations.
This is not just a matter of policy—it’s a matter of trust, innovation, and a shared vision. A thriving commercial LEO economy depends on flexible, forward-looking governance that empowers private industry while safeguarding public interests. NASA’s role should be that of a strategic enabler, not a gatekeeper.
Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments will be posted.