International space law has struggled with how to deal with non-kinetic antisatellite weapons. (credit: UN)

When satellites are hacked: the legal gray zone of non-kinetic space attack

by Aakansh Vijay and Udit Jain
Monday, January 26, 2026

Satellites are the foundation of modern civilization. Global navigation systems, aviation safety, financial transactions, disaster management, and defense operations all depend on space-based services. As dependency on space infrastructure has increased, attacks on it show the emergence of a new silent modern conflict. During the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia jammed GPS signals that were used by civilian aircraft and iinterfered with the Starlink satellite internet service in Ukraine. The commercial satellite network has been experiencing jamming, spoofing, and cyber-attacks, thus indicating a new mode of warfare that is glaringly unregulated.

International accords, including the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and the UN Charter, falter in the face of this emerging, formidable new threat. There is no clear treaty or rules that ban non-kinetic ASAT attacks. Non-kinetic ASATs are weapons that are not physically destructive; these attacks leave no debris, make the attacker difficult to identify, and are sometimes reversible. While kinetic ASATs destroy the satellite, creating a cloud of debris, non-kinetic ASATs silently kill it, making such weapons less susceptible to legal regulation and thus raising the imperative need for such a legal framework.

This article seeks to explain the growing relevance of such non-kinetic ASAT weapons, the inadequacy of existing space law in regulating them, and ongoing international efforts to develop norms. It begins with the distinction between non-kinetic and kinetic ASAT weapons, and how the latter is daunted by an existing legal gap. Further, the article discusses the international law that exists on ASAT weapons, what all the current framework covers, and what it inexplicably excludes. It also explains recent endeavors to establish norms. The article concludes by providing a pragmatic solution to opening new legal pathways that may help and assist the existing legal vacuum.

The distinction between kinetic and non-kinetic ASAT weapons: legal and operational considerations

Traditional kinetic ASAT systems physically destroy satellites, creating long-lasting orbital debris. Examples include missile interceptors launched from the Earth or even satellites sent into orbit to collide with others, such as the 2007 Chinese missile strike on one of its own satellites and India’s 2019 Mission Shakti ASAT Test. These attacks lead to the creation of large amounts of space debris that can endanger other space users.

By contrast, non-kinetic ASAT weapons disable a satellite without any direct control. They include high-powered directed energy weapons such as lasers that blind or damage a satellite’s sensors, electronic warfare systems that jam or spoof satellite communications, and cyberattacks that corrupt satellite software or data links. They leave no debris and can be reversible and stealthy. Recent incidents include February 2022 cyberattack on the Viasat KA-SAT satellite network that caused widespread disruptions across Europe and North Korea’s GPS jamming operations against South Korea in 2024, which interfered with civil aviation and maritime navigation without causing physical damage or orbital debris.

A satellite could be momentarily hindered by a ground-based laser, have its signals disrupted, or be given corrupt data, any of which could render it useless in a fight. The non-kinetic ASATs that cause these effects find themselves in a legal gray zone. Kinetic ASATs are attacks that apply direct physical force to a target, turning it into fragments and creating space debris. This type of attack is defined easily and very destructive. By contrast, non-kinetic ASAT techniques like lasers or jammers only disable satellites without causing any debris. For example, a laser positioned on the ground might completely ruin the detector of a satellite’s camera, and the ground-based jammers may overpower the satellite’s radio frequencies. Cyberattacks disabling a satellite’s capabilities belongs to the same category.

In emerging warfare techniques, kinetic weapons remain conspicuous and are marked by legal regulation as can be seen by recent UN resolution 77/38, but their non-kinetic counterparts are in a legal vacuum. Both kinds pose a substantial risk to effective satellite services, but only kinetic ASATs have been met with evident international condemnation. Non-kinetic attacks, such as GPS jamming or spoofing, have been void of any international legal status, clearing a way for powerful states to deter rival powers in space and not face any legal action.

Targeting the skies: what international law says and doesn’t about non-kinetic ASATs

The international legal framework that purports to govern state conduct in outer space remains situated in an era where the main threat was kinetic destruction and not electromagnetic or cyber interference. The OST serves as the foundational bedrock of international space law, but its provisions lack technological relevance today, rendering it ineffective in the new digital age. Article IX states that states’ activities must be conducted in concurrence with other states’ interests and with an expectation that states avoid harmful interference with the activities of others in outer space. But the intent of drafting these terms as can be seen from travaux préparatoires, from when these terms were drafted, focuses on “physical collusion” rather than “cyber intrusions.”

Article III further incorporates the UN Charter into space activities, thus making the Charter’s law on use of force applicable to outer space. However, the travaux préparatoires of the Charter reflects that the provision was framed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War with a peculiar focus of preventing armed invasion, bombardment, and other forms of military destruction. The extension of prohibition to non-military form of coercion was deliberately rejected.

This understanding of force, which is based on damage, has been a constant feature in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the Court limited the prohibition to any armed forces and drew the distinction between the armed forces and other lesser manifestations of interference, whereas in Oil Platforms and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo it evaluated the use of force as the scale, the effects, and the physical consequences of a given conduct. Thus, the reversible character of most non-kinetic ASAT activities counteracts the outmoded threshold of unlawful use of force, which generally requires physical damage, lasting impairment, or tangible destructive consequences. This makes the applicability of UN Charter article 2(4) contingent on consequences, which will exclude most electromagnetic interference such as jamming, spoofing, or transient sensor disruption. It creates a gray zone where gaps could be exploited between peacetime and wartime.

A novel development in the regulation of non-kinetic interference has been the International Telecommunication Union framework, which seeks to regulate the allocation and authorized use of radiofrequency spectra. The mentioned framework forbids harmful interference and also applies to radio-frequency forms of electronic interference against satellites. However, the ITU has no coercive enforcement mechanism and lacks such an investigative arm, and the absence of any authority to attribute interference thus renders the value of such a regime nugatory. Further, the oversight to include cyber interference, directed energy attack, or non-radio-frequency soft kill systems, excluding substantive aspects of the non-kinetic ASAT toolkit framework.

While customary international law principles such as state responsibility or due diligence, and subsequently the provision on preventing significant transboundary harm, could, in theory, apply to non-kinetic ASAT operations. However, there is a conspicuous absence of effective state practice. States have seldom accepted their responsibility for soft-kill interference, and geopolitical incentives discourage public attribution. A lacuna in state practice and opinion juris exhibits such customary international law as nascent.

While the law of armed conflict provides more concrete rules such as proportionality, distinction, and necessity, it applies only to exceptional situations of armed conflict, thus excluding its extension to most of the non-kinetic ASATs occurring during the period of peacetime strategic competition. The preeminent spacefaring nations, China and the USA, have explicitly declared that soft-kill operations are primarily designed to pre-hostility tools and do not intend to transgress escalatory thresholds.

The foregoing analysis clearly showcases that there exists a clear vacuum in the regulation of non-kinetic weapons as impaired by dispersed and weakly enforced rules. The result is a permissive environment where technologically advanced states keep on developing with minimal legal constraint, and the accelerating militarization of non-kinetic counterspace systems represents one of the most substantial regulatory impediments in modern space security governance. The evolution of non-kinetic ASAT technology has advanced beyond the development of international law, leaving a vacuum which the existing legal framework is unable to fill.

Evolving standards: efforts and progress in norm development

Threats to counterspace capabilities are increasingly recognized today. The UNGA and its subsidiary processes have been the principal arenas for this arrangement. The UN established an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behavior, holding multiple sessions and producing a comprehensive Chair’s summary, meticulously articulating a broad range of candidate norms, transparency measures, and further work. The discussions and documents shaped non-kinetic capabilities as an urgent and required policy problem due to their reversibility, attribution challenges, and further potential to generate misperception and inadvertent escalation.

Another effort produces detailed technical and legal assessments with the intent to inform emerging state practice. The Secure World Foundation’s Global Counterspace Capabilities assessments provide a public evidence-based catalogue constituting both kinetic as well as non-kinetic programs, indicating most contemporary operational counterspace activity to be non-destructive and reversible. The Woomera Manual and related report reiterate that existing international law, particularly the law of armed conflict and use of force, applies to space operations. These manuals don’t develop new law but instead provide reasonable and authoritative restatement that states and militaries can adopt in doctrine and practice.

However, such substantive engagement has not created any concrete legal institutions at the intergovernmental level. The OEWG made meaningful progress to identify subject matter for norms and building confidence, but it glaringly failed in the adoption of a single substantive report with consensus language at its conclusion. Concurrently, the UN General Assembly did adopt targeted measures: for instance, the Assembly approved a resolution on destructive direct-ascent ASAT testing, thus crystallizing a political aversion to debris-creating kinetic testing, but leaving non-kinetic measures largely unaddressed by that particular instrument.

To avoid arduous treaty negotiations, experts are now focusing on practical steps to prevent space conflicts effectively. These steps include sharing more data on satellite locations, updating rules on the sale of sensitive space technologies, and creating systems for countries to jointly investigate satellite attacks. There is also a major push to clarify existing international law by getting nations to agree upon what would constitute a hostile action in space. Experts at places like the UN Institute for Disarmament Research are working on a key legal idea, by focusing on the UN Charter’s Article 2(4) that bans use of force, arguing that if all countries could reach an understanding on types of action that are conspicuous use of force, it would be a practical and normative advance short of a formal treaty.

Suggestions and a way forward: bridging the legal vacuum in non-kinetic space operations

An integrated, holistic approach is critical to effectively fill the legal gap that exists in this novel arena of international space law. The strategy should encompass a calibrated mix of hard law as well as soft law norms, along with transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBM). On the hard law front, measures must involve amendments that explicitly prohibit forms of non-kinetic interference. In addition, core terms such as harmful interference, use of force, jamming, spoofing, and directed energy attacks must be provided with an unambiguous definition to prevent opportunistic interpretation. Thus, such an instrument must effectively showcase the reality emphasized by the UK OEWG submission, which stipulates that most counterspace threats originate from Earth and encompass reversible but strategically destructive actions. Creation of a UN Space Commission, coupled with updates in the liability convention to include serious non kinetic interference within its ambit, stands as a step in the right direction. This would be advantageous to strengthen accountability as well as attribution.

Soft law reforms are crucial given that political consensus for contemporary binding rules is limited. Renewed efforts towards a non-binding international code of conduct for outer space activities could set up shared expectations by urging states to refrain from intentional jamming, cyber interference, or unnotified proximity operations. The UK OEWG Working Paper notes that misperception and miscalculation represent central risks in today’s competitive space environment, given a lack of information about satellite capabilities and intent. Thus, a soft law instrument can efficiently reduce escalation risks by encouraging transparency in testing, pre-notification of potentially dual-use activities, and open communication during maneuvers. Adopting measures such as avoiding co-orbital positioning near another state’s national security satellite or no-first-use assurance would be a positive movement. Strengthening ethical codes, such as those of the commercial operators, enhances cyber hygiene, anti-jamming resilience and incident reporting, thus fortifying the standard expectation of non-interference.

Finally, enforcement must be strengthened and TCBMs should be prioritized to efficiently enforce accountability. As UNIDIR studies and UK OEGW studies promote that states must institutionalize measures such as shared space situational awareness (SSA) data, joint mechanisms to detect harmful interference, routine notifications of maneuvers or tests and an international incident exchanging platform for reporting jamming or spoofing events. A clearer standard for intent and context and escalation management would therefore help prevent misinterpretation and inadvertent conflict. In an era where satellites can now be compromised without a single fragment of debris, international law cannot remain silent within the gray zone of non-kinetic space attacks, where legal ambiguity has itself emerged as a strategic weapon.

Aakansh Vijay and Udit Jain are third-year students at National Law University, Jodhpur, India, with a keen academic interest in international law and space security governance.

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