A space tracking radar site being developed by the US, UK, and Australia in Western Australia. (credit: Apache Drone Photography)

Space situational awareness in Southeast Asia

by Iuna Tsyrulneva
Monday, October 26, 2026

In recent years, orbits have become more crowded as large constellations and frequent launches have added many new satellites, which now number more than 14,000 as of earlier this year.[1] Moreover, the European Space Agency estimates that 40,000 of pieces of space debris larger than ten centimeters are being actively tracked,[2] with far more debris being too small to track reliably.

This means that satellite operators have a greater need to avoid collisions that threaten operational continuity for communications, navigation, weather, and disaster monitoring services. Avoiding collisions may also necessitate performing close-approach maneuvers and other activities such as on-orbit servicing and inspection, which blur the line between commercial operations and military intent.

The strategic implications of crowded orbits are seen in two recent examples. In November 2025, China’s Shenzhou-20 crewed spacecraft that was docked with the Tiangong space station suffered viewport micro-cracking that was attributed to debris.[3] This prompted China’s first emergency return mission via an uncrewed Shenzhou vehicle that evacuated its astronauts safely. Similarly, in January 2026, ground observers reported the partial disintegration of Russia’s retired spy Luch/Olymp satellite in a graveyard orbit above the geostationary (GEO) belt, possibly due to impact from space debris [4].

The extent of avoidance operations by satellite operators is evident from the American commercial space company SpaceX reporting that its Starlink satellites executed nearly 50,000 collision‑avoidance maneuvers over a six‑month period from December 2023 to May 2024,[5] illustrating how the day‑to‑day workload of avoiding space debris is rising as orbits become more crowded.

In this context, space situational awareness (SSA) makes detection, tracking, identification, and characterization of objects in space (active satellites, defunct satellites, rocket bodies, and debris) possible. It also facilitates predicting whether and when objects in space might come close to each other or re‑enter the atmosphere, informing operators about what is in orbit; and how to predict risky close approaches, thereby enabling them to act early to prevent accidents and interruptions. SSA reduces ambiguity by improving attribution: who moved, how, and whether the behavior is routine or threatening.

Technologies used in SSA

SSA comprises sensors to observe objects and analytics to turn observations into predictions and alerts. SSA sensors can be grouped by where they are located (ground or orbit) and what they “see” (radar/radiofrequency [RF] technology or optical). Table 1 below summarizes the main technology families, their strengths, limits, and examples.

Effective SSA requires a mix of sensor information and robust data fusion so that gaps in one modality are compensated for by another. For example, ground‑based optical SSA is limited by atmospheric phenomena and observation geometry, which can degrade detection and positional accuracy. However, data collected by space-based optical sensors can complement ground-based SSA to maintain coverage and accuracy. The US-Japan QZSS‑6 [16] hosted payload launched in 2025 illustrates how one sensor stream is designed to fill gaps in others, as it will support the fusion of space‑ and ground‑based space domain awareness and feed near‑real‑time data into the Space Surveillance Network, improving the United States Space Force’s ability to detect, characterize, and attribute unusual maneuvers or close approaches that could signal counterspace activity. According to the US Space Force, this mission is the first bilateral US-Japan national-security space cooperation that is strategically important because it links Japan’s regional GNSS infrastructure with US space-domain-awareness needs.

The global SSA landscape

The organizational landscape for SSA is best understood as three overlapping layers: international bodies that set norms and coordination mechanisms, states that operate or sponsor core tracking networks and public warning services, and a fast‑growing private sector that supplies sensors, analytics, and operational data.

Globally, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) provides guidance on long-term sustainability through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), covering regulatory approaches, operational safety, cooperation, and capacity‑building, laying the foundation for responsible behavior. UNOOSA promotes international cooperation in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space, including the use of space science and technology for sustainable economic and social development. It helps UN Member States build space law, policy, and regulatory frameworks.

Table 1. Main strengths and limitations of SSA technologies

The Inter‑Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is the core technical coordination forum among major space agencies. Its debris‑mitigation guidelines provide widely used best practices on limiting debris release and avoiding collisions, underpinning many national rules and standards. For example, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines cover measures such as limiting debris released during normal operations, minimizing on-orbit breakups, preventing collisions, and planning post-mission disposal.

Major global players have a lot of similarities in defining SSA and assigning operational providers. For example, the EU frames SSA in a service-oriented way through the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) initiative, focusing on collision avoidance, reentry assessment, and fragmentation analysis, emphasizing safety and sustainability. The EU SST also positions itself as a key operational capability for Europe’s emerging approach to space traffic management.

Meanwhile, the United States has historically emphasized spaceflight safety and catalog maintenance. The US Space Force’s 18th Space Defense Squadron (SDS) commands and controls the Space Surveillance Network, catalogs objects, and runs a SSA data‑sharing program that distributes tracking data to a wide range of partners. NASA’s Conjunction Assessment and Risk Analysis (CARA) safety protocol for space operations is also supported by routine screenings performed by the 18th SDS.

Japan’s approach is split between a civilian technical track and a defense operations track. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) describes SSA as monitoring debris, maintaining orbit catalogs, analyzing close approaches, and predicting re‑entries, supported by radar, optical telescopes, and an analysis system. In parallel, Japan’s Ministry of Defense established a Space Operations Squadron with a mission to operate an SSA system to monitor debris and suspicious satellites and to cooperate closely with the United States.

Opposite to public service-oriented systems like EU SST, Russia’s SSA activities are less transparent internationally and appear to be integrated with military space surveillance and national-security functions. Russia hosts a dual military-civil architecture: a military Space Control System associated with Russian Space Forces and Roscosmos-linked civilian Automated Warning System on Hazardous Situations in Outer Space (ASPOS OKP). Russian military SSA tasks include detecting, tracking, cataloging, identifying, and characterizing orbital objects, monitoring foreign orbital groups, predicting re-entries, and warning of potentially dangerous approaches to Russian spacecraft. ASPOS OKP supports spaceflight safety through conjunction assessment, fragmentation analysis, reentry prediction, and monitoring of high-orbit objects.

India has formalized SSA through a space sustainability lens. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) System for Safe and Sustainable Space Operations Management (IS4OM) coordinates SSA activities, including close-approach risk assessment, uncontrolled re-entry prediction, space-object population monitoring, and compliance with international long-term sustainability guidelines. India also performs routine Collision Avoidance Analysis (COLA) and Collision Avoidance Maneuvers (CAMs) for its satellites and launch vehicles. Moving from an ISRO-centered SSA model toward a broader national SSA ecosystem involving private and academic entities, India started developing SSA regulation for non-governmental actors.

China has focused on building dedicated organizations for debris monitoring and data applications. The China National Space Administration’s Space Debris Observation and Data Application Centre supports tracking and monitoring of near‑Earth objects. However, there is limited publicly available information on Chinese SSA activities, which is itself an important gap for regional interoperability. Industry and operator consortia are also increasingly indispensable because they collect and store high‑precision data. The Space Data Association (SDA) is an operator-led organization that pools operational data to improve conjunction assessment and enable better space traffic coordination among members. Similarly, Privateer’s Wayfinder provides near real-time visualization and tracking of satellites and debris, making space traffic information more accessible to a growing space community through the partnership with the International Space Station National Lab based in the United States.

Commercial SSA firms such as LeoLabs and ExoAnalytic Solutions run sensor networks and provide operator services that complement government systems. The contribution of private companies is not limited only to on-the-ground activities. NorthStar, for example, launched the first satellites of a commercial space-based SSA service providing continuous monitoring for maneuvers, anomalies, and conjunction warnings in LEO, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) and GEO. Private companies occupy an important niche in SSA by increasingly filling the capability and data gaps, improving coordination, and facilitating public access to information.

The current state of SSA in Southeast Asia

Across Southeast Asia (SEA), SSA is slowly moving from a niche concern to a practical priority, mainly because regional economies depend on satellite communications, weather monitoring, navigation, and disaster response. Table 2 provides a compact, non-exhaustive snapshot of publicly documented SSA-related activities in selected SEA countries.

Based on the analyzed sources, SEA space agencies choose partners mainly to obtain (1) neutral convening and shared norms, (2) mature tools and training, and (3) immediate access to trusted tracking data. Singapore’s former OSTIn used SCOSA-linked policy exchanges to convene ASEAN officials with external experts and industry, consistent with Singapore’s stated strategy of shaping rules-based practices and building international partnerships rather than relying solely on local sensor construction. Multistakeholder workshops reflect that SSA challenges exceed the capacity of any single nation, so politically neutral UN bodies are selected as partners to legitimize cooperation and data sharing. SSA training partnerships with JAXA and ESA leverage already established agency tools to build competence quickly.

An assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies [22] notes that most Indo‑Pacific countries lean on US, EU, and China for tracking information, which keeps satellites safer but also leaves gaps in access, timeliness, and consistency with data format. In practice, many operators in the region combine alerts from the US public catalog, European collision and reentry services, and industry analytics, then reconcile them by hand: a fragmented approach as the space congestion grows.

Table 2. SSA-related activities in selected SEA countries

For other ASEAN members, publicly available information on dedicated SSA capabilities remains limited, and efforts often appear fragmented across civil, research, and defense stakeholders. This is however explainable: SSA programs are data‑intensive, require sustained funding, and often sit at the intersection of civil safety and national security.

Barriers and advantages in Singapore to developing native SSA capabilities

Singapore’s dense urban planning and limited land make it challenging to host large radars or wide-baseline optical telescopes. ASEAN states in drier climates and latitudes offer superior sites. This difference suggests a “distributed hardware, centralized analytics” model. Here, partner countries host sensors where geography is favorable, while Singapore focuses on being an analytics and connectivity hub, providing the service of standardizing data formats, fusing multiple catalogues, and coordinating procedures across operators. This mirrors Singapore’s strengths in systems integration and managing complex high‑reliability operations, such as ports and aviation.

Dependence on multiple providers from military, governmental, and commercial sectors, sometimes with inconsistent orbit predictions and alerts, complicates understanding the space environment and slows down the response by regional actors. The World Economic Forum published SSA data-sharing principles,[23] highlighting transparency in sharing public and private space data. Singapore can posit itself as a SSA Data Exchange Hub that brokers operator-provided information about spacecraft with public and commercial catalogs. To make such a hub credible, Singapore would need (1) clear domestic procedures for reporting spacecraft status changes and safety-relevant events, (2) trusted cross‑border data-sharing arrangements, and (3) a focus on data governance and interoperability.

Singapore published in 2024 Guidelines for Singapore-Related Space Activities [24] that established spacecraft registration and safety reporting. However, everyday procedures, such as how to share planned maneuvers, how fast to respond to close-approach threats, and what to publish for reentries, remain undefined. Inspired by the busy automated port network in Singapore, which owns its digital twin for simulating complex activities, Singapore can adopt a similar approach to tracking space operations.

Conclusion

With Earth’s orbits becoming more congested, raising the risk of service disruption for communications, navigation, weather and disaster response, operators are forced to spend more resources on collision avoidance. SSA, built on a mix of sensors and robust data fusion, turns observations into timely collision, reentry, and anomaly warnings, reducing ambiguity as dual-use behavior grows. Globally, SSA is shaped by UN norms, state operational providers, and an expanding commercial sector. In SEA, progress is uneven: Thailand is operationalizing SSA tools, the Philippines is building skills, and Singapore is best positioned today as a trusted regional analytics and data-exchange hub.

Acknowledgment. This paper has been developed with the support of and guidance from Manoj Harjani, Research Fellow and Coordinator of Military Transformations Programme, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.

References

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Iuna Tsyrulneva is a Research Fellow at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, working on space AI and space sustainability and looking into military space technology as a personal interest.

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