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Cosmos 2589 launch
The launch of Cosmos 2589, a spacecraft with a likely counterpsace mission. (credit: Russian MoD)

The successful development of Russia’s counterspace activities in LEO and GEO

by Matthew Mowthorpe and Markos Trichas
Monday, January 19, 2026


Russia has continued to develop its arsenal of counterspace capabilities. This has been undertaken often under the guise of developing experimental space systems. This research and development once in orbit and successfully proven has become operational. This includes co-orbital ASAT (Nivelir) systems described as space domain awareness and space-based situational systems.

Soviet history has shown Russia capable of developing multiple classes of orbital ASAT systems. As will be shown in the analysis of orbital regime, maneuverability, and actions, there is a strong likelihood that Russia is developing multiple kinetic interceptor types of co-orbital ASATs. However, for simplicity in this article, we shall refer to all co-orbital ASATs with some sort of kinetic intercept capability as “Nivelir” class satellites.

Soviet history has shown Russia capable of developing multiple classes of orbital ASAT systems. There is a strong likelihood that Russia is developing multiple kinetic interceptor types of co-orbital ASATs.

Russia recently successfully developed a Nivelir ASAT capability in GEO. Alongside this has been ground-based ASAT development, most notably the successful interception in November 2021 against a Russian defunct satellite. This was seen by some observers as a warning to the US and NATO allies, prior to the invasion of Ukraine, not to interfere with Russia’s military attack. Other Russian counterspace systems, such as the potential deployment in 2022 of a nuclear weapon, have signalled Russian intent to overcome US megaconstellations such as Starlink. This article analyses these offensive ASAT capabilities, along with directed energy weapons and electronic warfare both from space- and ground-based ASATs.

Direct-ascent assets

Besides the highly advanced co-orbital assets, Russia has been developing highly capable direct-ascent systems. Direct-ascent systems are ground-based systems, often mobile, which include a ground-to-space missile designed to intercept a target satellite. Such a Russian system, named Nudol, has been tested around ten times with varying levels of success. Almaz-Antey, whose principal role is active space defense technologies, has pitched the system as valuable for holding US LEO assets at risk.[1] Nudol is a TEL-based system composed of the 14A042 Nudol rocket, 14P078 command and control system, and 14TS031 radar. In November 2021, Russia successfully intercepted one of its own satellites in LEO, using Nudol. The operational capability of NUDOL is up to 850 kilometers. It is likely, given successful testing, Nudol is operational.

Russian co-orbital ASAT development: Nivelir

On December 25, 2013, three small satellites were launched into LEO that looked like a routine Rodnik satcom activity. The Russian Ministry of Defense publicly announced the three satellites—Cosmos 2488, 2489, and 2490—had successfully separated from the upper stage. However, a fourth payload, Cosmos 2491, was catalogued by the US military. Cosmos 2491 remained dormant until the end of 2019, in LEO at an altitude of 1,500 kilometers. Cosmos 2491 was identified by NASA as a secretive Russian satellite which performed orbital rendezvous and inspection maneuvers.

On May 23, 2014, during another Rodnik mission, three military satellites were declared by the Russian government: Cosmos 2496, 2497, and 2498. Like the 2013 launch, a fourth payload was identified, Cosmos 2499.They performed a similar maneuverers to the previous satellites. In 2015, three Gonets-M satellites were launched and openly declared as Gonets M11-M13, along with a classified military payload, Cosmos 2504.[2] After a period of inactivity, on March 27, 2017, Cosmos 2504 lowered its orbit and passed within two kilometers of a piece of Chinese debris from the 2007 ASAT test.

On June 23, 2017, Cosmos 2519 was launched, which Russian officials included “a space platform which can carry different variants of payloads”[3] It made a series of small maneuvers in late July and August. On August 23, 2017, a small satellite designated Cosmos 2521 separated from Cosmos 2519. Cosmos 2521 was declared by Russian officials as “intended for the inspection of the condition of a Russian satellite.”[4] On October 30, Cosmos 2523, another small satellite, separated from Cosmos 2521. Cosmos 2523 was released at a velocity of 27 meters per second. At this speed, it appears likely that Cosmos 2523 could be a projectile and part of an ASAT mission. Throughout March, April, and June 2018, Cosmos 2519 and 2521 conducted several rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs) of each other.[5]

On November 25, 2019, Russia launched Cosmos 2542, which was likely the second satellite in the Nivelir series. On December 6, Cosmos 2542 released a sub-satellite, Cosmos 2453, which remained within two kilometers of Cosmos 2542 for three days before it conducted a series of maneuvers to raise its apogee to 590 kilometers by December 16. These maneuvers suggest that Cosmos 2453 moved to where it could observe a US intelligence satellite, USA 245. Cosmos 2453 came within 20 kilometers of USA 245 several times in January 2020. This proximity sparked concerns from US Space Command.

In June 2020, Cosmos 2543 maneuverer to come within 60 kilometers of Cosmos 2535. On July 15, like the first Nivelir, a small piece of debris separated from Cosmos 2543 at a relative velocity between 140 to 186 meters per second. It is likely this is a similar event to Cosmos 2523 in October 2017, which was the first of Russia’s Nivelir test program. Both the US and UK Space Commands called on Russia to desist their testing of the system.[6]

Cosmos 2589 may achieve GEOin April. This is of significance as it represents the first time Russia will have an ASAT capability in GEO using Nivelir.

On August 1, 2022, a Russian Soyuz 2.1v launch vehicle placed a mysterious satellite, dubbed Cosmos 2558 (2022-089A, 53323) into LEO. The launch timing and initial orbit appeared to coincide with the orbital plane of USA 326, a classified NRO imagery satellite that was launched in February 2022. Analysis suggested that the orbits of Cosmos 2558 and USA 326 were very similar in inclination and would periodically come within 60 to 70 kilometers in altitude of each other. On August 18, 2022, USSPACECOM released a statement condemning Russia for this action, calling the activities of Cosmos 2558 “dangerous and irresponsible behavior.” Further analysis confirmed that, as of September 2022, Cosmos 2558 had altered its orbit to continue to match the orbital plane of USA 326, although it is not in an actual proximity orbit. It is unclear whether Cosmos 2558 is related to Cosmos 2535 or Cosmos 2542.

It is highly likely that Cosmos 2576 launched on May 16, 2024, is part of the Nivelir ASAT program. It is the fourth in the series of co-orbital ASAT testing satellites, like those condemned by both the US and UK Space Commands previously.

Recent Cosmos 2588 Nivelir ASAT activity

On 26 June 2025 Russia released a subsatellite from Cosmos 2558 what was called Object C (64627).[7] Russia maneuvered Object C twice between July 6 and 20. On July 8-10, Object C decreased its average altitude 16 kilometers, then on July 10-11 increased Object C’s altitude 33.7 kilometers.[8]

Object C, as of July 20, had an average altitude of 453.3 kilometers, whilst Cosmos 2558 had not maneuvered since mid-April 2025 and was losing average altitude and, as of Jul 20, was down to 449.4 kilometers.[9]

Object C’s orbital maneuvers put it at a closest point of approach with USA 326 on July 19 of 58 kilometers.[10] Prior to this the closest point of approach was about 76 kilometers.

Open-source speculation is that Cosmos 2558 and Object C are part of the Nivelir program[11] and that Object C was mirroring similar behavior to Cosmos 2542 and 2543, which came within 20 kilometers of USA 245 in January 2020.[12]

Between September 6 and 9, Cosmos 2588 raised its orbit by about 6.4 kilometers, remaining nearly coplanar with USA 338.[13] The closes point of approach is less than 100 kilometers every four days.

Cosmos 2589 and 2590 assessed Nivelir HEO proximity operations

On June 23, 2025, Cosmos 2589 (64467) was launched into a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) with an apogee of 51,200 kilometers and perigee of 20,374 kilometers. On June 26, Cosmos 2589 released a subsatellite, Object D (64527), and conducted maneuvering with Cosmos 2589. It is suspected that Cosmos 2589 is a Nivelir inspection satellite and has a counterspace capability.

Analysis of Cosmos 2589 and Object D

Cosmos 2589 and Object D continued to perform orbital manoeuvres between July 21 and August 2.[14] An observable maneuver from Cosmos 2589 was on July 7 with ranges between Object D varying between 100 kilometers on July 22 and less than 1 kilometers on July 27. At their closest approach they were less than one kilometer apart for more than hours, from about 1800 to 2223 UTC.[15] On August 1, the two satellites separated to beyond 60 kilometer, then rendezvoused to less than 10 kilometers.

On about August 3, Object D maneuvered, ending the proximity operations, or proxops, with Cosmos 2589.[16] On August 16, the two satellites were 55 to 130 kilometers apart.

Between August 20 and 27, Object D made small maneuvers, resuming proxops with Cosmos 2589.[17] It is assessed that Object D made the majority of the maneuvers, and closes point of approach was less than 15 kilometers.

On 18-19 July 2025 Cosmos 2589 and Object D conducted a close approach of less than five kilometers, some reports that it could have been less than one kilometer.[18] Object D was registered in September 2025 as Cosmos 2590.[19]

Cosmos 2589 and Cosmos 2590 continue to perform operations. Their orbital parameters are separated by 6 to 15 kilometers.[20] Cosmos 2590 is performing the bulk of the maneuvers while Cosmos 2589 likely did not perform any maneuvers in August and September. The last reported clear maneuver was July 8.[21] Cosmos 2590 maneuvered several times between September 29 and October 9. Cosmos 2589 and 2590 had proxops of seven kilometers on October 1 at 1016 UTC.[22] Following this, the two satellites separated and, as of October 10, they are more than 200 kilometers apart.

After months of operating in proximity with one another Cosmos 2589 and Cosmos 2590 appear to be heading their separate ways. Cosmos 2589 began conducting maneuvers to circularize its orbit on November 19.[23] Once Cosmos 2589’s orbit has been circularized, the satellite will have finally joined the geosynchronous belt. From the orbital projections below, assuming that Cosmos 2589 maintains its current circularizing maneuvers, it will achieve GEO on April 21, 2026. This is of significance as it represents the first time Russia will have an ASAT capability in GEO using Nivelir.

Electronic warfare (EW) at space targets and from space

Russia demonstrated its GPS jamming capability during the Russian 2017 Zapad military exercise[24] and during a NATO exercise, when Norway determined Russia was responsible for jamming GPS signals in the Kola Peninsula during Exercise Trident Juncture.[25] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in April 2021 identified in Ukraine an increase in GPS jamming by Russian or pro-Russian forces. On April 6, 2021, a Special Monitoring Mission long-range UAV was unable to take off from a Ukrainian airbase in Stepanivka due to GPS signal interference. In addition, Russian jamming of GPS signals in Ukraine has been detected by US forces in the region.

On the February 24, 2022, a cyberattack against a commercial satellite network belonging to the US company Viasat not only had an impact on Ukrainian military actors but also damaged the terminals of civilian customers across Europe and affected thousands of wind turbines in Germany. Tens of thousands of satellite modems had their internet service knocked out after being flooded with traffic along with destructive commands to overwrite key data. This highlights the wider impact that cyberattacks can have on the satellite industry.

Jamming of satellite communications

“Traditional” satcom jamming is another counterspace area where Russia have invested significant effort. The R-330Zh “Zhitel” mobile jammer is reported to able to jam commercial Inmarsat and Iridium receivers within a tactical local area. The TsNII research institute has declared that Tirada-2S was under development and will be used to conduct uplink jamming of comsats.[26] It is likely Tirada-2S is currently in service. Another system under development is Bylina-MM, which is designed to suppress the on-board transponders on comsats such as Milstar, Skynet, and Italsat.[27]

Another key project in Russia’s EW program is TOBOL, designated 14Ts227 with a project infrastructure code of 8282. Indications about the goals of Tobol suggest that the site would have an array of ground-based antennas that would pick up and jam what are called unauthorized signals sent to satellites or relayed via satellites to the ground. Vladimir M. Vatutin, who heads a department within Russian Space Systems and is identified as TOBOL’s chief designer, has coauthored several papers and patents related to the protection of satellites from electronic attack. One such patent describes an array of ground-based antennas that would be used to pick up and jam unauthorized signals sent to satellites relayed via satellites to the ground.[28] In another scenario, unauthorized signals downlinked from a satellite to the ground would be identified by monitoring stations, following which the tropospheric stations would transmit jamming signals that would reach receivers after being reflected off the troposphere and cancel out the effects of the unauthorized signals.[29]

Another paper co-authored by Vatutin discussed the possibility of using EW techniques to prevent both optical and radar reconnaissance satellites from sending images to data relay satellites as they fly over. This reflects growing interest in the use of EW systems to counter foreign reconnaissance assets. Finally, the Krashuka-4 mobile EW system, designed to counter airborne early warning and control and other airborne radar, has an effective range of 300 kilometers. Due to its range and power, it is also effective against LEO synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging satellites.

Directed energy weapons

Russia has a long history of research in high-energy laser physics. Directed energy weapons (DEW) damage a target with highly focused energy without a solid projectile. Russia revived its old Soviet Airborne Laser system in 2012, called Sokol-Echelon. The Russian ABL was designed to counter space-based reconnaissance assets in the infrared part of the spectrum, dazzling rather than destroying. The laser type selected was a carbon monoxide laser. In mid-2018 a court document declared that the MOD had decided to cancel the project in late 2017; however, contracts signed as part of the project continue to appear on the Russia’s government procurement website afterwards. Reporting has suggested that Ukraine had destroyed the airfield which contained the Russian ABL system which would indicate that Russia no longer has such a capability.[30]

What is clear is any detonation in LEO of a Russian nuclear weapon in space would have an indiscriminate effect on satellites in LEO for a significant period of time.

Russia is upgrading its Krona optical surveillance system in North Caucasus with laser dazzling capabilities. The Krona complex historically included ground-based radars and optical telescopes for tracking, identifying, and characterizing space objects. Under a project codenamed Kalina for the Ministry of Defense, its goal was the creation of a channel for the suppression of electro-optical systems of satellites using solid-state lasers. Russia is also planning to develop a laser with a range of 40,000 kilometers to attack early warning satellites in geosynchronous orbit.

Russian pursues nuclear weapons in space

US officials stated in February 2024 that Russia was pursuing the development of a space-based ASAT weapon equipped with a nuclear device. Clarification came from the White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby that it was “not an active capability that’s been deployed.”[31] Further details were not provided, but he did confirm it was “related to an anti-satellite weapon that Russia is developing.” This action would be in clear breach of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space.

The Russia satellite referred to is Cosmos 2553, was launched February 5, 2022. The Russian Ministry of Defense referred to it as a “technological satellite equipped with newly developed on-board instruments and systems in order test them in conditions of radiation and heavy particle charged particles.”[32] This is likely a cover story for Cosmos 2553’s likely nuclear mission. It was launched into an orbit of 1,987 by 1,995 kilometers with an inclination of 67 degrees. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in LEO, and the subsequent nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects, could render that orbital regime unusable for up to a year if not longer. US intelligence agencies have assessed that Cosmos 2553 was a practice test run for putting a nuclear weapon into orbit.[33]

The Russian development of a nuclear weapon in orbit in space is seen as the only effective way of countering a megaconstellation such as Starlink or the US Space Development Agency’s Proliferated Space Warfighting Architecture. What is clear is any detonation in LEO of a Russian nuclear weapon in space would have an indiscriminate effect on satellites in LEO for a significant period of time.

Summary of Russian Counterspace Activities

Launch Date Country Satellite System
25/12/2013 Russia Cosmos 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491 Nivelir ASAT development
5/2023 Russia Cosmos 2496, 24907, 2498, 2499 Nivelir ASAT development
23/6/2019 Russia Cosmos 2519, 2520, 2521, 2523 Nivelir ASAT development
10/7/2019 Russia Cosmos 2542, 2543 Nivelir ASAT development
5/2/2022 Russia Cosmos 2533, 2558 Nivelir ASAT development
16/5/2024 Russia Cosmos 2576 Nivelir ASAT development
5/2/2025 Russia Cosmos-2581, 2582, 2583 Nivelir ASAT development
6/2025 Russia Cosmos 2558 & Object 64627 Nivelir ASAT development
6/2025 Russia Cosmos 2589 Nivelir ASAT development in GEO predicted 21 Apr 26
7/2025 Russia Cosmos 2590 (Object) Nivelir ASAT development
21/10/2022 Russia Cosmos 2561 and Cosmos 2562 RF Directed Energy RF ASAT[34]
15/11/2021 Russia Nudol Direct Ascent ASAT
5/2/2022 Russia Cosmos 2553 Nuclear ASAT

Table of Russian Counterspace Activities compiled from various sources including Secure World Counterspace, Final Frontier Flash, ISR University and STK predicted orbital analysis.

References

  1. Weeden & Samson, 2021. Weeden, B., and V. Samson. Global Counterspace Capabilities, April 2021, 67
  2. Weeden, B. "Dancing in the Dark Redux: Recent Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in Space." The Space Review, October 5, 2015.
  3. "Soyuz-2-1v Launches a Secret Satellite." RussianSpaceWeb.
  4. "Soyuz-2-1v Launches a Secret Satellite." RussianSpaceWeb.
  5. Weeden, B., and V. Samson. Global Counterspace Capabilities, April 2021, 70.
  6. The Guardian, 2020. "Britain and US Accuse Russia of Launching 'Weapon' in Space." The Guardian, July 23, 2020.
  7. Russia Update: Cosmos 2558 & Object C, Issue 125 issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025
  8. Russia Update: Cosmos 2558 & Object C, Issue 125 issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025
  9. Russia Update: Cosmos 2558 & Object C, Issue 125 issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025
  10. Speculation KH-11 optical satellite
  11. Stephen Clark, “It’s hunting season in orbit as Russia’s killer satellites mystify skywatchers”, ArsTechnica.com, 11 July 2025
  12. Matthew Mowthorpe, The Russian Space Threat and a Defence Against it with Guardian Satellites, 13 June 2022, The Space Review. In July 2020 a piece of debris separated from Cosmos 2543 at a relative velocity 140 to 186 meters per second, similar to the Russian Nivelir event in of Cosmos 2523 in October 2017.
  13. Russia Maneuvers Cosmos 2588, 14 Sep 25, Flash ISR University
  14. Russia: Cosmos 2589 and Obj C 21 Jul-1 Aug, 4 Aug ISR University Flash
  15. Russia: Cosmos 2589 and Obj C 21 Jul-1 Aug, 4 Aug ISR University Flash
  16. Russia Update: Cosmos 2589 & Object C, 18 Aug 25, ISR University Flash
  17. Russia: Object C Renews RPO with Cosmos 2589, 30 Aug 25, USR University Flash
  18. issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025
  19. Russia: Cosmos 2589 & Cosmos 2590 (Object C) Update, ISR Integrity Flash, 14 Sep 2025
  20. Russia: Cosmos 2589 & Cosmos 2590 (Object C) Update, ISR Integrity Flash, 14 Sep 2025
  21. Russia: Cosmos 2589 & Cosmos 2590 (Object C) Update, ISR Integrity Flash, 14 Sep 2025
  22. Russia: Cosmos 2589 and 2590 Update, USR Integrity Flash, 13 Oct 2025
  23. Cosmos 2589 Moving to GEO, Update, ISR Integrity Flash , 8 Dec 2025
  24. The War Zone, 2019 "Russia Jammed Phones and GPS in Northern Europe During Massive Military Drills." The War Zone, 2019.
  25. Episkopos, 2021. Episkopos, M. "GPS Jamming: Can NATO Defeat This Russian Weapon in the Arctic?" National Interest, March 3, 2021.
  26. Hendrickx, 2020. Hendrickx, B. "Russia Gears Up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2)." The Space Review, November 2, 2020.
  27. Weeden & Samson, 2021
  28. Hendrickx, 2020. Hendrickx, B. "Russia Gears Up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2)." The Space Review, November 2, 2020.
  29. Hendrickx, 2020. Hendrickx, B. "Russia Gears Up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2)." The Space Review, November 2, 2020.
  30. Dwayne A. Day, “Burning Falcon: the death of a Russian laser ASAT plane”, Space Review, 1 December 2025.
  31. BreakingDefense, 2024 Hitchens, T. "Local Russian GPS Jamming in Ukraine Hasn’t Affected US Support Ops, So Far." Breaking Defense, March 1, 2022.
  32. Final Frontier Flash." ISR University, February 13, 2022.
  33. Hendrickx, B. "Russian Research on Space Nukes and Alternative Counterspace Weapons Part 1." The Space Review, May 13, 2024.
  34. For further details see “Russian and Chinese development of radiofrequency directed energy weapons (RF DEW) for counterspace”, The Space Review, 12 May 2025. The author would like to thank Bart Hendrickx for his comments in connection with the article.

Dr. Matthew Mowthorpe currently works in the UK Military Future Programmes at Airbus Defence and Space. Prior to this, he worked at the Ministry of Defence, where he managed the Space Team examining threats to and from Space. Dr Mowthorpe has published in numerous journals on the weaponization of space and notably published the book The Militarization and Weaponization of Space published by Rowman and Little in the US.

Dr. Markos Trichas is the Head of UK National Eyes Only Space programs at Airbus Defence and Space UK. He has been with Airbus for nine years. Prior of joining Airbus he worked at Harvard CFA/NASA CXC, STFC RAL, and Imperial College London. He holds a PhD in Astrophysics from Imperial College London.

The views expressed in the article are personal ones.

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